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WHY PROTECT UNAUTHORIZED WORKERS? IMPERFECT PROXIES,
UNACCOUNTABLE EMPLOYERS, AND ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW’S
FAILURES
Angela D. Morrison*
This Article explores a gap in the scholarship regarding the unauthorized
workplace. It describes and names the two main justifications on which
advocates and courts have relied to extend federal antidiscrimination
protections to unauthorized workers. First, the proxy justification insists that
workplace protections must include unauthorized workers because their
protection is necessary to protect U.S. citizen and authorized workers.
Second, the deterrence/accountability justification states that workplace
protections must include unauthorized workers because it will deter
employers from future violations of antidiscrimination laws and hold them
accountable for violations of immigration law. While these justifications have
led to some protection for workers, especially under federal
antidiscrimination laws, unauthorized workers have still found themselves
without full remedy. The existing scholarship attributes this to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB and its
emphasis on the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA)’s
prohibition on hiring unauthorized workers.
This Article argues that attributing the lack of full remedy solely to
Hoffman is an incomplete account. It ignores the role that antidiscrimination
law’s two primary, normative principles play in the justification’s
limitations. First, anticlassification’s status-neutral and individually-focused
*
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principles exacerbate the stereotyping effects of the proxy justification, which
results in limited access to remedies and misapplication of legal doctrines.
Antisubordination also fails to achieve full protection for unauthorized
workers. It can be difficult to get buy-in to the idea that workers who are
unauthorized should be protected because antisubordination principles,
unlike anticlassification principles, do not protect all workers regardless of
status. Its historical reliance on immutability also means that courts and
some policy makers may resist protecting unauthorized workers because they
view immigration status as changeable. This also can lead to further
stereotyping. Accordingly a fuller account of the unauthorized workplace
shows that the proxy and accountability/deterrence justifications’ failure to
fully protect unauthorized workers is not only the result of IRCA and
immigration policy. The drawbacks of anticlassification and
antisubordination principles lead to less robust protections for unauthorized
workers, too.
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INTRODUCTION
The main justifications for protecting unauthorized workers under federal
antidiscrimination laws have failed to provide full protection for those
workers. Unauthorized workers are more vulnerable to unlawful
discrimination in the workplace and face more challenges to claims-making
under federal antidiscrimination laws than their authorized counterparts. The
prevailing justifications that advocates and scholars’ have developed has
contributed to this. But the justifications are not solely responsible for the
lack of protections. The justifications developed in the context of existing
antidiscrimination law. Antidiscrimination law’s two main normative
principles made room for the gaps in protection that unauthorized workers
face.
The Supreme Court in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB held
that a noncitizen worker who lacked immigration status was not entitled to
remedy under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).1 The Court
reasoned that awarding an unauthorized worker backpay under the NLRA
would “subvert” the immigration enforcement goals of the Immigration
Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).2 Scholars have documented how this decision
made unauthorized workers more vulnerable to workplace abuses.3
Scholars and advocates, then, have focused on why, despite IRCA,
federal workplace laws still protect unauthorized workers.4 Two main
justifications have emerged. First, workplace protections must include
unauthorized workers because their protection is necessary to protect U.S.
citizen and authorized workers. I call this the proxy justification. Second,
workplace protections must include unauthorized workers because it will

1

Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 140 (2002).
Id. at 149–50.
3
See, e.g., Leticia M. Saucedo, The Making of the “Wrongfully” Documented Worker, 93 N.
CAR. L. REV. 1505 (2015); Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of Unauthorized
Immigrants: The Experiment Fails, 2007 UNIV. CHI. LEGAL FORUM 193; Kathleen Kim, Beyond
Coercion, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1558 (2015); Leticia M. Saucedo, The Employer Preference for the
Subservient Worker and the Making of the Brown Collar Workplace, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 961 (2006);
Kati L. Griffith, Undocumented Workers: Crossing the Borders of Immigration and Workplace
Law, 21 CORNELL J. L. & POL’Y 611 (2012).
4
See, e.g., Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Redefining the Rights of Undocumented Workers, 58
AM. L. REV. 1361 (2009); Griffith, supra note 3; Angela D. Morrison, Executive Estoppel, Equitable
Enforcement, and Exploited Immigrant Workers, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 295, 297 (2017).
2
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hold employers accountable and deter future violations of the workplace and
immigration laws. I call this the accountability and deterrence justification.
These justifications have led to some protection for workers, especially
under federal antidiscrimination laws.5 Virtually every court to have
considered the issue since Hoffman Plastics has found that unauthorized
workers have standing to sue their employers for violations of federal
antidiscrimination laws.6 But the proxy justification and the
accountability/deterrence justification have resulted in unauthorized workers
being less protected than their authorized counterparts. The proxy
justification means that unauthorized workers only get treated the same as
authorized workers up to a point. If the main reason to protect unauthorized
workers is to protect authorized workers, then anything that implicates only
the workers’ immigration status means that unauthorized workers will lose
the protection the proxy justification provides.7
The accountability/deterrence justification opens the door to two
stereotypes that exist about unauthorized—that they are essentialized
workers willing to take the jobs that authorized workers won’t, or that they
are criminals who broke the law to take jobs from authorized workers. On the
one hand, placing unauthorized workers in the role as victims of abusive
employers potentially robs them of their agency and reinforces stereotypes
about immigrant workers as an exploitable, subservient workforce.8 On the
other hand, it also sets up a “comparative culpability analysis” that invites
courts to view unauthorized workers as criminals and, therefore, less
deserving of protection.9 Kathleen Kim has called this latter stereotype
“complicity framing.”10
This Article argues that the failures of the proxy and
accountability/deterrence justification are not traceable only to IRCA and
Hoffman. Instead, the normative underpinnings of federal antidiscrimination
5

See discussion infra Part II.
See discussion infra Part II.
7
See, e.g., Escobar v. Spartan Sec. Serv., 281 F. Supp. 2d 895, 897 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (denying
full remedy to unauthorized workers because of their unauthorized status).
8
Saucedo, The Employer Preference for the Subservient Worker, supra note 3, at 970
(describing the stereotype of the subservient, immigrant worker); Jennifer J. Lee, Outsiders Looking
In: Advancing the Immigrant Worker Movement Through Strategic Mainstreaming, 5 UT. L. REV.
1063, 1070 (2014) (noting the dangers generally of relying on a narrative of unauthorized workers
as passive victims).
9
Kim, supra note 3, at 1580.
10
Id.
6
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law—anticlassification and antisubordination—can explain why the
justifications fail to fully protect unauthorized workers who experience
unlawful discrimination. Anticlassification’s status-neutral and individuallyfocused principles exacerbate the proxy justifications’ role in making
workers more vulnerable to attacks that they should be treated differently
because they lack immigration status. That anticlassification theory is
individually-focused also means it reinforces complicity framing.
Antisubordination also fails to achieve full protection for unauthorized
workers. It can be difficult to get buy-in to the idea that workers who are
unauthorized should be protected because antisubordination principles,
unlike anticlassification principles, do not protect all workers regardless of
status. Its historical reliance on immutability also means that courts and some
policy makers may resist protecting unauthorized workers because they view
immigration status as changeable. This also can lead to further complicity
framing.
Thus, the proxy and accountability/deterrence justifications’ failure to
fully protect unauthorized workers is not only the result of IRCA and
immigration policy. The drawbacks of anticlassification and
antisubordination principles lead to less robust protections for unauthorized
workers, too.
This Article proceeds in five parts. In Part I, it describes IRCA and
explains how IRCA’s enforcement has contributed to the vulnerability of
unauthorized workers in the workplace. Part II introduces the proxy and
accountability/deterrence justifications and demonstrates how courts have
used those justifications to determine federal antidiscrimination laws apply
to unauthorized workers. Part III outlines the limits of the justifications in
terms of access to full remedy and increased vulnerability in the workplace.
Part IV explains the antisubordination and anticlassification principles and
how they have been used to justify antidiscrimination law and policy. In Part
V, the article concludes that the antidiscrimination and antisubordination
principles
exacerbate
and
contribute
to
the
proxy
and
accountability/deterrence justifications’ failures.
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IRCA’S EMPLOYMENT BAN, ITS ENFORCEMENT, AND THE
EMPLOYER RESPONSE

Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in
1986.11 IRCA changed existing immigration law in three significant ways.
First, it created a legalization program for individuals who have been in the
United States without immigration status since 1982.12 Second, it reformed
existing legal immigration programs, including creating the H2-A
nonimmigrant visa for temporary agricultural workers,13 providing for
adjustment of status for agricultural workers in the United States who
performed seasonal agricultural work,14 and the visa waiver pilot program.15
Finally, IRCA, for the first time, regulated the employer/employee
relationship based on the employee’s immigration status.16 It barred
employers from hiring workers who were in the country without
authorization.17
Congress relied on two main rationales to ban the employment of
unauthorized workers. First, Congress sought to reduce irregular migration.18
Many believed that that the United States served as a “jobs magnet” for
unauthorized immigrants and that unauthorized immigration would decrease
if Congress penalized employers who hired unauthorized migrants.19 Second,
some in Congress also believed that the presence of unauthorized immigrants
in the workforce “had significant negative effects for domestic workers,
especially ‘low-income, low-skilled Americans, who are the most likely to

11

Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359.
Id. § 201. The program is also known as the “Reagan Amnesty.”
13
Id. § 301.
14
Id. § 302.
15
Id. § 313.
16
Saucedo, The Making of the “Wrongfully” Documented Worker, supra note 3, at 1506–07.
17
IRCA § 101 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2018)).
18
Saucedo, The Making of the “Wrongfully” Documented Worker, supra note 3, at 1512;
Wishnie, supra note 3, at 203 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 99-682(I) (1986) and citing S. REP. NO. 99132 (1985)).
19
See, e.g., Wishnie, supra note 3, at 195 (citing U.S. Immigration Policy and the National
Interest: The Final Report and Recommendations of the Select Commission on Immigration and
Refugee Policy with Supplemental Views by Commissioners, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (Mar. 1,
1981)); Saucedo, The Making of the “Wrongfully” Documented Worker, supra note 3, at 1512–14.
12
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face direct competition’ from the undocumented.”20 In sum, Congress hoped
to deter extralegal migration and “safeguard[] wages and working conditions
for U.S. workers.”21
IRCA created an employment authorization regime which requires that
employers verify an employee’s identity and work authorization status.22 The
Act also imposes civil and criminal penalties on employers who fail to verify
an employee’s identity and work authorization status, knowingly hire
“unauthorized” noncitizens, or continue to knowingly employ unauthorized
noncitizens.23 IRCA defines an unauthorized noncitizen24 as a noncitizen who
“is not at that time either (A) . . . lawfully admitted for permanent residence,
or (B) authorized to be so employed by this Act or by the Attorney
General.”25
Although IRCA does not impose criminal penalties for working without
authorization, it includes provisions that penalize individuals who present
fraudulent documents to obtain work.26 These sanctions are in addition to
20
Wishnie, supra note 3, at 195 (quoting Immigration and Reform Control Act of 1985, S. REP.
NO. 99-132 (1985)).
21
Id. at 195–96, 203–04. Wishnie also notes that “there was a political rationale for employer
sanctions.” Id. at 196. IRCA also included a legalization program that made three million people
eligible for immigration status. Id. So, “IRCA promised both legalization and increased
enforcement—politically something for all sides.” Id.
22
IRCA § 101 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) (2018)).
23
Id. (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a) (2018)).
24
This article uses the term “noncitizen” rather than “alien.”
25
IRCA § 101 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3) (2018)).
26
Id. § 103 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1546(b) (2018)):

(b) Whoever uses —
(1) an identification document, knowing (or having reason to know) that the document
was not issued lawfully for the use of the possessor,
(2) an identification document knowing (or having reason to know) that the document is
false, or
(3) a false attestation,
for the purpose of satisfying a requirement of section 274A(b) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, shall be fined in accordance with this title, or imprisoned not more than
two years, or both.
Noncitizens who violate this provision also face additional immigration penalties—they
are inadmissible and removable.
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immigration penalties for unauthorized work that the Immigration and
Nationality Act already included.27 Still, as Leticia Saucedo notes, at the time
that Congress passed IRCA, IRCA’s sanctions were “aimed at employers.”28
Nonetheless, employers successfully lobbied to weaken some of IRCA’s
sanctions and the federal government, for the most part, has focused its
enforcement on employees, rather than employers.29 In response to
employers’ lobbying, Congress amended the statute to allow employers to
correct “technical or procedural” violations of IRCA’s document verification
requirements.30 Employers who make “a good faith attempt to comply with
the requirement” have ten days to fix the error after notice by the federal
government.31
One of the results has been uneven enforcement of IRCA’s provisions
against employers. During the 1990s, audits of employers’ compliance with
IRCA’s document verification program declined 77%, warnings to
employers declined 62%, and final orders against employers in
administrative proceedings declined 82%.32 From 2000 to 2014, although the
numbers of final orders and civil fines against employers increased, the
number of employers who were subject to fines were only .02% of employers
in the United States.33 More recently, ICE has claimed that it increased
employer audits by 340% in 2018 as compared to 2017.34
Criminal prosecutions of employers are rarer. Between April 2018 and
March 2019, only eleven employers were criminally prosecuted for

Immigration & Nationality Act (INA) §§ 212(a)(3)(C), 237(a)(6)(C) (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1227(a)(3)(C), 1182(a)(6)(C) (2018)).
27
INA § 245(c)(2) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c)(2) (2018)) (prohibiting the adjustment of
status of any noncitizen who continues in or accepts unauthorized employment).
28
Saucedo, The Making of the “Wrongfully” Documented Worker, supra note 3, at 1513.
29
Id. at 1513–14.
30
Id. at 1514 (citing Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, § 411, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-666 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a)(6)
(2018)).
31
INA § 274A (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(6) (2018)).
32
Wishnie, supra note 3, at 209 (citing GAO statistics for the period from 1990 to 2003).
33
ANDORRA BRUNO, CON. RESEARCH SERV., IMMIGRATION-RELATED WORKSITE
ENFORCEMENT: PERFORMANCE MEASURES 4 (2015).
34
ICE, HSI FY2018 Achievements, Worksite Enforcements (Aug. 7, 2019),
https://www.ice.gov/features/worksite-enforcement.
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employing unauthorized workers.35 In 2015, the Congressional Research
Service concluded that “[v]iewed more broadly, ICE administrative and
criminal arrests in worksite enforcement operations represent a very small
percentage of the potential population of violators.”36 Thus, on the one hand,
IRCA’s prohibition on employing unauthorized workers is underenforced.
On the other hand, legacy INS and ICE have consistently focused
enforcement efforts on employees who violate IRCA’s fraudulent document
provisions. Workplace raids during the Bush administration led mainly to the
arrests of workers who used false documents to obtain work, leaving
employers relatively unaffected.37 The same held true during the first term of
the Obama administration.38 And that pattern has re-emerged under the
Trump administration. In 2018, the Trump administration charged 666
workers with criminal violations, an increase of 812% from the prior year.39
A more recent workplace raid in Mississippi in 2019 resulted in the arrest of
680 workers.40 To the extent that ICE has engaged in worksite enforcement,
then, its efforts have largely centered on workers, not employers.
The federal government’s subsequent under- and over-enforcement of
IRCA’s provisions have created an opening for employers to develop an
exploitable workforce; this results from both the criminalization of
undocumented work and a perception of unauthorized workers as
subservient.41 First, the de facto criminalization of unauthorized work makes
the status of unauthorized workers more precarious.42 Because the
government prosecutes workers for document-related crimes the “mere act
35

TRAC Immigration, Few Prosecuted for Illegal Employment of Immigrants (May 30, 2019),
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/559/.
36
BRUNO, supra note 33, at 8.
37
Kim, supra note 3, at 1574.
38
Alan Gomez, Feds Targeting More Worksites Crack Down on Undocumented Workers but
not their Employers, USA TODAY (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/
2018/12/11 /donald-trump-targeted-more-worksites-undocumented-immigrantsimmigration-andcustoms-enforcement/2263656002/.
39
Id.
40
Henry Grabar, After ICE, SLATE (Aug. 18, 2019, 7:00 p.m.), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2019/08/ice-raids-mississippi-chicken-plants-aftermath-children.html.
41
Saucedo, The Employer Preference for the Subservient Worker, supra note 3, at 970; Griffith,
supra note 3, at 629–35; Wishnie, supra note 3, at 211–13; Morrison, supra note 4, 297, 321; Kim,
supra note 3, at 1573–75.
42
Kati L. Griffith & Shannon M. Gleeson, The Precarity of Temporality: How Law Inhibits
Immigrant Worker Claims, 39 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 111, 121–22 (2017).
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of working, which requires inventing or borrowing a Social Security number,
also places unauthorized migrants at risk of arrest.”43
And given employers’ role in the enforcement of immigration law
through IRCA’s required document verification process, unauthorized
workers may view their employers as part of the immigration enforcement
regime.44 As a result, employers have more power over unauthorized workers
who have used false identity documents to obtain their employment because
they fear their employers will report them for criminal prosecution.
Through her fieldwork, anthropologist Sarah Horton has documented the
increased vulnerability that using false identity documents has created for
unauthorized workers as compared to workers who are able to work
unauthorized but under the table:
[M]igrant farm-worker interviewees told me that
unauthorized workers were not the most disadvantaged
category of workers in the fields. As I conducted interviews
about the causes of workplace accidents and why injured
migrants chose not to pursue workers’ compensation claims,
interviewees pointed to one particular category of worker as
the most vulnerable: los que trabajan los papeles de otros
(those who work under other people’s papers). Interviewees
told me that it was this particular subset of unauthorized
workers who did not take breaks, who did not report their
injuries to supervisors, and who did not collect workers’
compensation when injured.45
Workers become not only deportable but also what Horton terms
“denounce-able.”46 Workers are denounce-able when they use false identity
documents in the document verification process because at any moment they
fear their employer could report them to ICE for criminal prosecution.47 Thus,
43

Sarah B. Horton, From “Deportability” to “Denounce-ability:” New Forms of Labor
Subordination in an Era of Governing Immigration Through Crime, 39(2) POLAR 312, 314 (2016).
44
Griffith & Gleeson, supra note 42, at 123.
45
Horton, supra note 43, at 315.
46
Id. at 314.
47
Id. at 314. Sarah Horton also describes the process through which individuals obtain false
identity documents. Id. at 316–17. The workers she interviewed prefer “identity loan.” Id. Because
the workers are concerned that buying false documents on the open market with a made-up social
security number could inadvertently result in actual identity theft, the workers borrow a friend or
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workers, at best, fear that they will lose their jobs, and, at worst, that their
employers will report them to ICE should they complain about their working
conditions.48 The result is that employer power in the workplace is
enhanced.49
Second, the vulnerability of unauthorized workers has created a
perception among employers that unauthorized workers, particularly
unauthorized Latinx workers, are more subservient.50 In turn, employers
engage in practices that create “unwanted jobs” and target vulnerable workers
for their perceived subservience.51 Employers have done this through
network hiring, job structuring that leads to segregation through pay rates and
conditions of employment, and hiring only perceived unauthorized workers
for certain jobs.52 The vulnerability this creates has meant that unauthorized
workers face pay discrimination, working conditions that are unsafe,
harassment that includes sexual assault, and retaliation—all based on their
national origin or sex. 53
family member’s valid identity documents for the purposes of the employment verification process.
Id. at 317.
48
Griffith & Gleeson, supra note 42, at 123.
49
Id. at 121.
50
Saucedo, The Employer Preference for the Subservient Worker, supra note 3, at 970.
51
Id. at 976–80.
52
Id. at 976–80. As Saucedo notes, employers use national origin as a proxy for immigration
status. Id. at 970. Accordingly, these practices include not just unauthorized workers, but Latinx
workers as a whole. Id.
53
See, e.g., Scott Soriano, The Rape Crisis Among California’s Farm Workers, CAPITOL
WEEKLY (Jan. 9, 2020), https://capitolweekly.net/the-rape-crisis-among-californias-farm-workers/
(reporting that “nearly 51,000 farm worker women have been sexually assaulted or raped through
coercion or blackmail” many of whom lack work authorization); Mica Rosenberg & Cristina Cooke,
Allegations of Labor Abuses Dogged Mississippi Plant Years Before Immigration Raids, REUTERS
(Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-koch-foods/allegations-oflabor-abuses-dogged-mississippi-plant-years-before-immigration-raids-idUSKCN1UZ1OV
(describing a suit a meat processing company settled with the EEOC for $3.75 million which
included allegations that unauthorized workers were subjected to sexual and physical assaults, and
threats to turn them over to immigration authorities if they complained); Eli Rosenberg, How a
Worker Who Survived a Catastrophic Building Collapse Ended up in ICE Detention, WASH. POST
(Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/11/25/how-worker-whosurvived-catastrophic-building-collapse-ended-up-ice-detention/ (describing an unauthorized
worker who was placed in removal proceedings after reporting his employer for labor and safety
violations). I have previously collected cases and news articles in my scholarship. See Angela D.
Morrison, Free Trade, Immigrant Workers, and Employment Discrimination, 67 KAN. L. REVIEW
237, 240–41 nn. 13–16 (2018) (citing EEOC v. Global Horizon, Inc., 7 F. Supp. 3d 1053, 1059–65
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In summary, IRCA made it unlawful for employers to hire unauthorized
workers but did not make it unlawful for employees to work without
authorization. Nonetheless, Congress has enacted laws that criminalize using
false documents or misrepresenting one’s immigration status to obtain
employment. The result has been underenforcement of IRCA against
employers and overenforcement of criminal laws against unauthorized
workers. In turn, unauthorized workers have been increasingly viewed as
both criminal and as exploitable, thereby intensifying employer power in the
unauthorized workplace.

II. CURRENT JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PROTECTING UNAUTHORIZED
WORKERS UNDER FEDERAL ANTIDISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
LAWS
Although unauthorized workers have successfully argued that they are
protected under federal antidiscrimination laws, courts have failed to provide
full protection to unauthorized workers. Just over a decade after Congress
enacted IRCA, the Supreme Court decided Hoffman, in which it found an
unauthorized worker was not entitled to backpay because of his unauthorized
status.54 Advocates and scholars worked to develop legal justifications to

(D. Haw. 2014) (alleging that the employer subjected Thai noncitizen workers to abusive terms and
conditions of employment due to their national origin); SOUTHERN POVERTY L. CTR. & ALA.
APPLESEED, UNSAFE AT THESE SPEEDS: ALABAMA’S POULTRY INDUSTRY AND ITS DISPOSABLE
WORKERS 39–40 (2013) (describing workers in the Alabama Poultry Industry who reported
harassment and dangerous and undesirable work assignments due to their national origin);
SOUTHERN POVERTY L. CTR., CLOSE TO SLAVERY: GUESTWORKER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED
STATES 31–33 (2013) (describing noncitizen workers with guest-worker status who experienced
pay discrimination based on their national origin or gender); Sasha Khoka, Silenced by Status, Farm
Workers
Face
Rape,
Sexual
Abuse,
NPR
(Nov.
5,
2013),
http://www.npr.org/2013/11/05/243219199/silenced-by-status-farm-workers-face-rape-sexualabuse (describing female, agricultural workers who were afraid to report sexual assaults because of
their unauthorized status); Rape on the Night Shift (PBS Frontline 2015) (reporting about sexual
assaults of noncitizen custodial workers); MARY BAUER & MÓNICA RAMIREZ, INJUSTICE ON OUR
PLATES: IMMIGRANT WOMEN IN THE FOOD INDUSTRY 22–29, 41–47 (2010) (describing retaliation,
harassment, and wage theft that noncitizen women faced in the workplace)); See also Angela D.
Morrison, Executive Estoppel, Equitable Enforcement, and Exploited Immigrant Workers, 11
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 295, 297, 320–21 & 321 nn. 177 & 179 (2017) (collecting cases and media
reports).
54
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
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distinguish workers seeking protection under Title VII from workers seeking
protection under the NLRA.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,55 prohibits employers from
discriminating against workers on the basis of sex, race, national origin,
color, or religion.56 Those protections include prohibitions on subjecting an
employee to a hostile work environment or harassment, disciplining an
employee, terminating an employee, or subjecting an employee to different
terms or conditions of employment.57 Title VII similarly prohibits employers
from retaliating against employees who exercise their rights under Title VII.58
Other federal antidiscrimination statutes protect employees from
discrimination on the basis of disability or age.59
The Supreme Court has not addressed directly whether IRCA bars
unauthorized workers from seeking relief under federal antidiscrimination
laws. But the Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in Hoffman Plastic Compounds
v. NLRB did address whether unauthorized workers could obtain relief for
their employers’ violations of the National Labor Relations Act. 60 In
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, a group of workers had participated in a union
organizing campaign at the company’s production plant.61 The company
subsequently laid off the workers who participated in the campaign.62 The
NLRB eventually determined that the company had laid off the workers
because of their union organizing activities, a violation of the NLRA.63 The
NLRB ordered the company to remedy the violation, including that the
company reinstate and provide backpay to the workers it unlawfully laid
off.64

55

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2 et seq. (2018).
42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-2(a).
57
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
58
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
59
See generally Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101 et seq. (2012); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 621 et seq. (2012).
60
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 140 (2002).
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 140–41.
56
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An administrative law judge held hearings to determine the amount of
backpay the company owed to each worker.65 During the hearings, one
worker testified that he lacked immigration status and admitted that he used
someone else’s birth certificate to obtain the documents he needed to work
in the United States.66 The NLRB awarded the worker backpay, reversing the
ALJ’s decision to deny backpay, for the period from when the company laid
off the worker to when it discovered the worker lacked immigration status.67
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court held the National Labor
Relations Board lacked authority under the National Labor Relations Act to
award backpay to an unauthorized worker.68 The Court pointed to IRCA to
support its decision, writing “allowing the Board to award backpay to
[unauthorized noncitizens] would unduly trench upon explicit statutory
prohibitions critical to federal immigration policy, as expressed in IRCA.”69
Subsequent to the Court’s decision in Hoffman, employers argued that
federal antidiscrimination laws either do not apply to unauthorized workers
because the employment relationship was not valid in the first instance70 or
that Hoffman limits the remedy to which workers are entitled.71 For the most
part, employers have been unsuccessful with the former argument72 and
successful with the latter.73 Given the success of the latter argument,
employers use the reasoning in Hoffman to argue that because the decision

65

Id. at 141.
Id.
67
Id. at 141–42.
68
Id. at 152.
69
Id. at 151.
70
See, e.g., Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 14–18, EEOC v. Restaurant Co., 490
F. Supp. 2d 1039 (D. Minn. Dec. 4, 2006) (No. 05-1656) (arguing that employee lacked standing
and was not an “employee” as defined by Title VII because employee was unauthorized).
71
See, e.g., Def.’s Br. as to Pls.’ Emp. Based Remedies at 6–7, Chellen v. John Pickle Co., 344
F. Supp. 2d 1278 (N.D. Okla. 2004) (No. 02-cv-85), 2004 WL 3342323.
72
See, e.g., Iweala v. Operational Tech. Servs., Inc., 634 F. Supp. 2d 73 (D.D.C. 2009)
(employer unsuccessfully argued employee had no standing to bring Title VII claim because she
was lacked immigration status); EEOC v. Restaurant Co., 490 F. Supp. 2d 1039 (D. Minn. 2007)
(employer unsuccessfully argued the EEOC did not have authority to bring suit because worker
claiming discrimination was unauthorized); EEOC v. Phase 2 Invests., Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 550
(D. Md. 2018)(same).
73
See, e.g., Escobar v. Spartan Sec. Serv., 281 F. Supp. 2d 895, 897 (S.D. Tex. 2003);
Restaurant Co., 490 F. Supp. 2d at 1047; Phase 2 Invests., 310 F. Supp. 3d at 580.
66
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limits the remedies to which unauthorized workers are entitled, discovery
into workers’ immigration status is warranted.74
When courts have determined workplace laws extend their protections to
unauthorized workers, they have relied on two justifications.75 The first
justification, the “proxy” justification, is that to ensure the protection of
authorized workers, that is, United States citizens and noncitizens with
authorization, in the workplace, workplace protections must extend to
unauthorized workers.76 The second justification, the “deterrence and
accountability” justification, looks at the impact on employers’ overall
compliance with federal workplace laws.77 Under this justification, courts
protect unauthorized workers because to do otherwise would allow
employers to evade accountability and would fail to deter employers from
engaging in discrimination in the future.78
But the justifications do not provide full protection to workers, as
described below.79 First, the justifications can increase vulnerability in the
74

See, e.g., Br. of Appellant at 17–19, 27–29, Rivera v. NIBCO, 364 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2004)
(No. 02–36155), 2003 WL 22670387.
75
Morrison, supra note 4, at 297, 303–05, 312; This article looks at workers who fit within the
antidiscrimination statutes’ definitions of “employee.” Many unauthorized workers do not meet the
threshold definition of employee because they are relegated to contingent work. Geoffrey Heeren
describes the gaps in IRCA that have resulted in unauthorized workers becoming subordinate in the
workplace, “the primary impact of employer sanctions is not to ban unauthorized workers from
working, but to relegate them to contingent positions where they do not receive the rights and
protections that traditional employees take for granted.” Geoffrey Heeren, The Immigrant Right to
Work, 31 GEO. IMM. L. J. 243, 246 (2017). He outlines three main exemptions in IRCA that allow
employers to escape sanctions: (1) independent contractors are not employees under IRCA;
(2) IRCA does not apply to self-employed entrepreneurs; and (3) sporadic, irregular, or intermittent
domestic service in a private home is not considered employment under IRCA. Id. at 245–46. As a
result, unauthorized workers in contingent positions do not enjoy the rights associated with a formal
employment relationship, namely, “minimum wage and overtime, Social Security and other
retirement benefits, unemployment insurance, workers’ compensation, collective bargaining rights,
and the protection of federal antidiscrimination laws.” Id. at 246.
76
Although no scholars have labeled this justification as the proxy argument, some scholars
have described aspects of it when discussing the unauthorized workplace. Morrison, supra note 4,
at 297, 312 (noting the chilling effect on U.S. citizen workers of failing to protect noncitizen
workers); see also Lee, supra note 8, at 1076 (noting “the interpretive frame of the universal worker
has also resonated with the courts by connecting the legal plight of immigrant workers to the greater
good of all workers”); HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 156 (2014).
77
Morrison, supra note 4, at 297, 303–05.
78
Id. at 297, 303–11.
79
See discussion infra Part II.C.

9 MORRISON (DO NOT DELETE)

132

3/23/20 9:18 PM

BAYLOR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:1

workplace because they reinforce harmful stereotypes about unauthorized
workers as either subservient or criminal. Second, the justifications result in
limited access to remedies because the proxy justification only extends
protections to unauthorized workers to the extent necessary to protect
authorized workers.

A. The Proxy Justification
There are two strands to the proxy justification. First, failing to protect
unauthorized workers from discrimination in a specific workplace will
deteriorate employment conditions for all workers in that workplace. As
Hiroshi Motomura has noted, “courts sometimes recognize that unauthorized
workers have workplace rights and remedies because any other outcome will
harm citizens and noncitizens who are working lawfully in the same
workplace.”80
Similarly, courts and advocates sometimes assert that allowing
unauthorized workers to assert workplace claims protects citizen and
authorized workers because it reduces unauthorized immigration over the
long term.81 According to proponents of this justification, reducing
unauthorized migration will result in more jobs for the authorized
workforce.82
Second, barring unauthorized employees from bringing claims would
also chill others’ claims under federal antidiscrimination laws. This
undermines all workers’ employment rights because federal workplace laws
rely on workers to act as private attorney generals for enforcement.83 The
court in EEOC. v. Restaurant, Co., relied, in part, on this justification when
it determined that the plaintiff had standing to pursue her Title VII claim even
though she was unauthorized.84 There, the employee alleged that her
supervisor subjected her to a hostile work environment based on her sex and
that her employer failed to promote her after she complained about her

80

MOTOMURA, supra note 109. Motomura views this as “a strong sign that unauthorized
workers are integrated into their workplaces.” Id.
81
Stephen Lee explains this viewpoint without adopting it and instead questions whether
granting workplace rights to unauthorized workers has reduced unauthorized migration. Stephen
Lee, Screening for Solidarity, 80 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 225, 232–34 (2013).
82
Id. at 233.
83
Morrison, supra note 4, at 303–05, 311–15.
84
EEOC. v. Restaurant, Co., 490 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1047 (D. Minn. 2007).
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supervisor’s harassment.85 The employer argued that the employee was not
entitled to bring a Title VII claim because she “may be” unauthorized.86 In
holding that unauthorized workers have standing to bring Title VII claims,
the court wrote, “Congress intended to empower individuals to act as private
attorneys general in enforcing the provisions of Title VII . . . . [A] ruling that
undocumented workers could not pursue civil rights claims on their own
behalf would likely chill these important actions.”87
Courts rely on similar reasoning to bar discovery into employees’
immigration status.88 In Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s grant of a protective order that prohibited the employer from
conducting discovery about the employees’ immigration status.89 The
workers in Rivera were Latina and Southeast Asian women who had limited
English proficiency.90 The employer required the women to take a basic job
skills exam administered only in English, even though the women’s job
duties did not require English proficiency.91 When the women did not
perform well on the test, the employer demoted or transferred them to
undesirable jobs, and eventually the employer fired them.92 During a
deposition, the employer asked one of the women where she was married and
born.93 Her attorney instructed her not to answer and requested a protective
order to prevent inquiry into the women’s immigration status and into
information likely to lead to discovery of the women’s immigration status.94
When the court granted the protective order, it emphasized the chilling
effect that allowing discovery would have on not just unauthorized workers,
but also on authorized workers: “[e]ven documented workers may be chilled
by the type of discovery at issue here.”95 It concluded that allowing discovery

85

Id. at 1043–44.
Id. at 1047.
87
Id.
88
See, e.g., Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004).
89
Id. at 1057.
90
Id. at 1061.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 1065. Other cases rely on similar reasoning that points out the impact on authorized
employees’ reporting of Title VII violations. See, e.g., EEOC v. Kovacevich “5” Farms, No. 1:06cv-0165, 2007 WL 1599772, *3–*5 (E.D. Cal. June 4, 2007) (denying employer’s motion to compel
86
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into immigration status would “unacceptabl[y] burden the public interest” in
light of Title VII’s “dependence on private enforcement[.]”96 The U.S.
district court for the District of Columbia adopted similar reasoning when it
granted a protective order that barred the employer from discovery into the
employee’s immigration status, writing the “chilling effect disadvantages all
workers as it makes it less likely that discriminatory practices will come to
light and be appropriately dealt with in a court of law.”97

B. The Deterrence and Accountability Justification
Deterrence and accountability as a justification stems from the idea that
protecting unauthorized workers from unlawful discrimination is necessary
to hold employers fully accountable under both antidiscrimination laws and
IRCA.98 Moreover, accountability is important because it deters future
violations of the law.99 In EEOC v. Restaurant Co., the court relied on
deterrence and accountability when it found that unauthorized workers may
bring Title VII claims, “[t]he Court also considers the need to reduce
employer incentives to hire undocumented workers because of their inability
to enforce their rights.”100 The Rivera court also highlighted accountability
and deterrence as justifications for protecting unauthorized workers:
“Congress has armed Title VII plaintiffs with remedies designed to punish

responses to interrogatories that would result in information about employees’ immigration status);
EEOC v. First Wireless Grp., 225 F.R.D. 404, 406 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (granting protective order to
bar inquiry into immigration status); EEOC v. Bice of Chi., 229 F.R.D. 581, 583 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
96
Rivera, 364 F.3d at 1065–66.
97
EEOC v. SOL Mexican Grill LLC, No. 18-2227, 2019 WL 2896933, at *2 (D.D.C. June 11,
2019); See also EEOC v. Maritime Autowash, Inc., 820 F. Supp. 3d 662, 670 (J. Niemeyer,
concurring) (concurring in decision to enforce EEOC’s subpoena to investigate allegations that
employer discriminated against unauthorized worker based on national origin only because “the
record plausibly suggests that the employer has engaged in a practice or pattern of discrimination
that adversely affects other employees who are authorized to work in the United States.”).
98
See, e.g., Kati L. Griffith, Discovering “Immployment” Law: The Constitutionality of
Subfederal Immigration Regulation at Work, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 389, 431 (2011); Kathleen
Kim, The Trafficked Worker as Private Attorney General: A Model of Enforcing the Civil Rights of
Undocumented Workers, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 247, 308 (2009); Cunningham-Parmeter, supra
note 4, at 1374–75.
99
Morrison, supra note 4, at 297, 303–05.
100
EEOC. v. Restaurant, Co., 490 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1047 (D. Minn. 2007).
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employer who engage in unlawful discriminatory acts, and to deter future
discrimination both by the defendant and by all other employers.”101
Other courts have relied on the deterrence and accountability justification.
In EEOC v. Maritime Autowash, Inc., the EEOC applied to enforce its
administrative subpoena that sought information from an employer alleged
to have discriminated against an unauthorized worker based on his national
origin.102 The employee alleged that after he was hired, his manager told him
that his name did not match his social security number.103 So the employee
said that the manager told him to get new documents with a new name.104
The employee did.105 After a DHS audit, the employee claimed the company
owner and a manager gave all of the Hispanic employees $150 for a one-time
bonus and said that they should use them to get new documents with new
names.106 The employer rehired the employees.107 Subsequently, the
employees complained to the employer that Hispanic employees faced
“longer working hours, shorter breaks, lack of proper equipment, additional
duties, and lower wages.”108 The employer fired them.109
When the employer resisted the subpoena and the EEOC sought
enforcement, the employer argued that the EEOC had no basis to issue the
subpoena because an unauthorized worker had no “standing or right to seek
remedies under Title VII[.]”110 The court rejected that argument writing, the
employer “is asking the court for carte blanche to both hire [unauthorized
workers] and then unlawfully discriminate against those it unlawfully hired.

101

364 F.3d at 1067.
EEOC v. Maritime Autowash, Inc., 820 F.3d 662, 663 (5th Cir. 2016). After the EEOC
finished its investigation, it found cause to believe that the employer violated Title VII and filed a
lawsuit against the company for discriminating against a class of employees on the basis of national
origin and race. EEOC v. Phase 2 Invests., 310 F. Supp. 3d 550 (D. Md. 2018). The suit settled and
resulted in a consent decree. EEOC, Maritime Autowash Will Pay $300,000 in EEOC Race and
National
Origin
Discrimination
Case
(Dec.
19,
2018),
https://www1.eeoc.gov//eeoc/newsroom/release/12-19-18.cfm?renderforprint=1.
103
Maritime Autowash, 820 F.3d at 663.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 664.
109
Id. at 663.
110
Id. at 664.
102
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[The employer] would privilege employers who break the law above those
who follow the law.”111
Officials at the agencies that enforce antidiscrimination laws, also rely on
this justification to refrain from asking workers about their immigration
status. Shannon Gleeson interviewed government officials at state and federal
agencies that enforce workplace rights, including the EEOC.112 When
Gleeson asked an EEOC official why the agency did not ask claimants about
their immigration status, he asserted that allowing employers to evade
workplace laws would create incentives for employers to evade immigration
laws: “if his agency were not allowed to enforce the rights of all workers,
employers would be emboldened to hire undocumented workers solely ‘with
the intent of exploiting them.’”113 And this would “reinforce the demand for
undocumented labor.”114
Relying on the proxy justification and the accountability/deterrence
arguments has meant that advocates have been successful in arguing that
federal antidiscrimination laws include in their protection unauthorized
workers.115 Although these justifications lead to some workplace protections
for unauthorized workers, they also limit the workers’ exercise of their rights.
As the next section shows, these justifications ultimately harm the rights of
unauthorized workers. They reinforce notions that unauthorized workers are
less morally deserving of the court’s protection than authorized workers and
subject unauthorized workers to scrutiny not faced by authorized workers
seeking to assert their workplace rights.

111

Id. at 668. In the subsequent litigation on the merits of the claim, the district court relied on
the Fourth Circuit’s language, in part, to decide that discriminating against an unauthorized
employee on the basis of race, national origin, or participation in an EEOC investigation is an
unlawful practice under Title VII. EEOC v. Phase 2 Invs. Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 550, 579–80 (D.
Md. 2018). The lower court also pointed to the importance of deterring other employers from
engaging in similar conduct. Id. at 580.
112
Shannon Gleeson, Means to an End: An Assessment of the Status-blind Approach to
Protecting Undocumented Worker Rights, 57 SOCIO. PERSPECTIVES 301, 301 (2014).
113
Id. at 310.
114
Id.
115
Morrison, supra note 4, at 302–20 (2017) (describing existing workplace protections for
noncitizens under federal law). The only exception is that noncitizen workers do not receive the
same protection from the Immigration Reform and Control Act’s (IRCA) unfair immigration-related
employment practices. INA § 275B, 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (2018) (prohibiting employer discrimination
against authorized employees on the basis of national origin and citizenship).
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C. The Limits of Current Justifications for Protecting Unauthorized
Workers
Viewing unauthorized workers as proxies for United States citizen
workers and authorized workers, may provide some protection for workers
but it also makes unauthorized workers more vulnerable. Likewise, focusing
on employer accountability and deterrence also results in unauthorized
workers receiving less protection than authorized workers. First, the
deterrence and accountability justification reinforces stereotypes about
immigrant workers, and, unauthorized workers, in particular. It casts the
unauthorized worker in either the role of the subservient and exploited
worker, or as a criminal. Second, the proxy justification shifts the focus from
the protected worker part of the employee’s identity to the unauthorized part
of the employee’s identity. It emphasizes how unauthorized employees are
different from authorized employees, that is, in the legality of their
employment relationship in the first place. The result is more vulnerability in
the workplace and limited access to remedies.

1. More Vulnerability in the Workplace
The narratives that flow from the accountability/deterrence justification
result in more workplace vulnerability for unauthorizes workers. The
narrative frames the harm as the employer’s failure to obey immigration laws
not employment laws. Relying on a narrative that “focuses on immigrant
workers as victims of criminal employers who fail to obey the rule of law”116
can create “stereotypes and classes of outsiders, resulting in disfavoring
immigrant workers who do not fit the role of the ‘good immigrant’—the
iconic hard worker or victim.”117
Three problems flow from this framing.118 First, it provides an incentive
for employers to show that an employee is not a “good immigrant” because
the employee violated criminal laws. It thereby emphasizes the viewpoint
that unauthorized workers are criminals who broke the law to obtain

116

Lee, supra note 8, at 1070.
Id. at 1066; see also Rebecca Sharpless, “Immigrants are not Criminals”: Respectability,
Immigration Reform, and Hyperincarceration, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 691, 706–11 (2016) (describing
generally the limitations and harmful effects of the deserving/undeserving immigrant narrative).
118
Lee, supra note 8, at 1096–101.
117
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employment.119 As described below,120 that can lead to limited remedies in
antidiscrimination claims, it also, as Lee notes, feeds into the general
“criminalization hysteria” surrounding immigrants.121 This results in a cycle
in which immigrant workers are targeted for enforcement actions rather than
employers.122 Second, unauthorized workers “may have to act the part of the
powerless victim to achieve results, although that may be contrary to their
personal empowerment.”123 It can also mean that the abuse must be egregious
enough that the workers can cast themselves as powerless victims.
Third, casting unauthorized workers solely as victims of unscrupulous
employers makes them into “essentialized workers who are divorced from
their individual characteristics as human beings[.]”124 This plays into the
stereotype of the subservient immigrant worker who will take the jobs that
authorized workers will not—for lower wages and under more dangerous
conditions.125 Employers, then, can take advantage of the stereotype and use
it to justify their treatment of unauthorized workers, casting unauthorized
workers as freely consenting to the conditions and lower wages.126 This
narrative regularly appears in media reports about workplace raids. For
example, in 2018, ICE conducted a raid on a worksite in Mount Pleasant,
Iowa.127 ICE arrested thirty-two employees, but not the employer.128 NPR
interviewed an employer in the town about unauthorized workers and the
employer responded that businesses needed immigrant workers because
businesses had difficulty filling jobs with authorized workers, “It is so hard
to get people in the door just to sit down and interview . . . You’re afraid
119

Id. at 1098.
See supra Part II.B.
121
Lee, supra note 8, at 1098.
122
See generally Saucedo, The Making of the “Wrongfully” Documented Worker, supra note
3; Angela D. Morrison, Free Trade, Immigrant Workers, and Employment Discrimination, 67 U.
KAN. L. REV. 237 (2018).
123
Lee, supra note 8, at 1099.
124
Id. at 1098.
125
Id. at 1098–99; see also Saucedo, The Employer Preference for the Subservient Worker,
supra note 3, at 970.
126
Saucedo, The Employer Preference for the Subservient Worker, supra note 3, at 976–80;
Kim, supra note 3, at 1580.
127
Jim Zarroli, With Workers Hard to Find, Immigration Crackdown Leaves Iowa Town in a
Bind, NPR (May 21, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/05/21/725096578/with-workers-hard-tofind-immigration-crackdown-leaves-iowa-town-in-a-bind.
128
Id.
120
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you’re going to scare them off. Any little thing that you do, they won’t show
up for the first day of work.”129 Other recent media reports reflect the same
narrative. A New York Times article had the following lede: “As a tight labor
market raises costs, employers say the need for low-wage help can’t be met
by the declining ranks of the native-born.”130 And after workplace raids in
poultry processing plants in Mississippi in 2019, people in the towns affected
by the raids reported that they didn’t believe that workers who were U.S.
citizens would remain in the jobs because “of the simple fact that the jobs are
hard . . . [i]t’s something they didn’t see themselves doing growing up.
Something they don’t want to do” and “American-born residents ‘didn’t want
to work, period.’”131 These narratives reinforce the stereotype that
unauthorized workers will take jobs that authorized workers will not—at
lower wages and under more dangerous conditions.
In short, the justifications play into stereotypes about unauthorized
workers. Because of their unauthorized status, they are viewed as
lawbreakers, on the one hand, but because of their employers’ actions they
are viewed as exploitable victims, on the other hand. The stereotypes work
to shore up the employer-created narratives that unauthorized workers
consent to unequal work conditions, including harassment, low wages, and
unsafe work environments.

2. Limited Access to Remedies
The proxy justification has led to limited access to remedies. It has
resulted in the misapplication of the after acquired evidence doctrine and the
mixed motive defense. And that misapplication matters because it has chilled
employees from pursuing their workplace rights in the first instance or in
foregoing full remedy for their employers’ violations. The misapplication of
doctrines in the Title VII context stands in contrast to how courts apply
similar doctrines in the FLSA context.

129

Id.
Eduardo Porter, Short of Workers, U.S. Workers Builders and Farmers Crave More
Immigrants,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
3,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/03/business/economy/immigration-labor-economy.html.
131
Richard Fausset, After ICE Raids, a Reckoning in Mississippi’s Chicken Country, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/us/mississippi-ice-raids-poultryplants.html.
130
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The difference between authorized workers and unauthorized workers has
resulted in courts misapplying legal doctrines, such as the after-acquired
evidence doctrine and Title VII’s mixed motive defense. In Title VII
litigation, employers may assert a defense to limit liability for illegally
terminating an employee when they subsequently learn that an employee
engaged in employment-related misconduct.132 Normally, an employer must
prove “by a preponderance of the evidence” that it would have terminated the
employee had it known about the misconduct.133 When an employer
successfully proves that it would have fired the employee, front pay and
reinstatement become unavailable to the employee, and backpay is limited to
the period prior to the employer discovering the misconduct.134 But some
courts have used the doctrine to limit recovery despite the difficulty of
proving that the worker’s unauthorized status would have resulted in the
worker’s termination or to bar a plaintiff’s claims entirely because the
employee lacked work authorization.135 Thus, courts’ focus on the
unauthorized status of the workers short-circuits the burden of proof that the
court would require if the employee were authorized.
Another doctrine that courts misapply to unauthorized workers is the
mixed motive defense. If an employer’s actions were motivated both by a
discriminatory reason and another non-discriminatory reason, an employer is
still liable under Title VII.136 However, an employer may avoid damages and
some equitable relief if the employer proves that it would have taken the
unlawful employment action anyways because of the nondiscriminatory
reason:

132

Christine N. Cimini, Undocumented Workers and Concepts of Fault: Are Courts Engaged
in Legitimate Decisionmaking?, 65 VAND. L. REV. 389, 445 (2012).
133
Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1070–71 (9th Cir. 2004).
134
Joseph Spadola, An Ad Hoc Rationalization of Employer Wrongdoing: The Dangers of the
After-Acquired Evidence Defense, 102 CAL. L. REV. 691, 696 (2012).
135
Cimini, supra note 132, at 445–47.
136
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2018). Regarding the mixed motives analysis, the statute provides:
(m) Impermissible consideration of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in
employment practices
Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is
established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other
factors also motivated the practice.
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(B) On a claim in which an individual proves a violation . . .
and [an employer] demonstrates that the [employer] would
have taken the same action in the absence of the
impermissible motivating factor, the court—
(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as
provided in clause (ii)), and attorney’s fees and costs
demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of
a claim . . . ; and
(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any
admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or [backpay].137
Under this doctrine, then, the employer should be required to show that it
took the action, in part, because of the worker’s unauthorized status.
But some courts have not required that employers show they took the
action because of the employee’s status, and instead have determined that the
unauthorized status, itself, forecloses backpay. For example, although the
court in Escobar v. Spartan Security Service138 held that Title VII applied to
an employee who was unauthorized when he worked for the employer,139 the
court determined the employee could not recover backpay for the period
during which he was not authorized to work.140 Other cases similarly have
found that the EEOC may not seek backpay or reinstatement when the
employee is unauthorized.141 In these cases, the court did not require the
employer to prove that it would have taken the action because of the workers’
immigration status or that it was motivated, in part, by the workers’ status.142
Moreover, because the cases involve hostile work environments, it would be
difficult if not impossible, for the employers to make that showing.
The misapplication is significant because it disincentivizes workers from
bringing claims. Lack of immigration status chills workers from bringing

137

Id. § 2000e-5(g)(B)(2)(ii).
Escobar v. Spartan Security Service, 281 F. Supp. 2d 895 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
139
Id. at 897.
140
Id.; see also EEOC v. Restaurant Co., 490 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1047 (D. Minn. 2007) (noting
that while unauthorized workers have standing to sue for Title VII violations, they may be precluded
from “certain remedies.”).
141
See, e.g., EEOC v. Phase 2 Invs. Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 550, 580 (D. Md. 2018).
142
Id.
138
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claims in the first place,143 but the lack of remedy further deters workers. As
Kati L. Griffith and Shannon M. Gleeson note “unauthorized employees are
also disincentivized from claiming because there is little clarity about
whether they have the same rights to monetary remedies . . . as compared to
their authorized counterparts.”144 It matters that courts have prevented
unauthorized workers from achieving full remedy because it prevents them
from bringing claims.
In other cases, the EEOC or the worker pre-emptively decide not to
pursue remedies to avoid discovery into the worker’s immigration status.145
In EEOC v. DiMare Ruskin, the EEOC alleged that supervisors subjected two
female farmworkers to a hostile work environment because of sex. 146 The
conduct included one supervisor telling one of the women that he wanted to
kiss her all over, including her breasts, and that he would never stop pursuing
her; it also included one supervisor forcing one of the woman’s hand to his
crotch.147 The EEOC moved for a protective order to bar the employer from
asking about the employees’ immigration status.148 The court granted it.149
As part of its reasoning, the court wrote, “[t]his case deals with sexual
harassment and unlawful termination for refusing to comply with a
supervisor’s sexual advances. All individuals, both citizens and immigrants,

143
Griffith & Gleeson, supra note 42, at 121–22 (summarizing the literature and citing Shannon
M. Gleeson, Labor Rights for All? The Role of Undocumented Immigrant Status for Worker Claims
Making, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 561, 563, 594 (2010); SHANNON M. GLEESON, PRECARIOUS
CLAIMS: THE PROMISE AND FAILURE OF WORKPLACE PROTECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 125–
27 (2016); SUNAINA MAIRA, RADICAL DEPORTATION: ALIEN TALES FROM LODI AND SAN
FRANCISCO IN THE DEPORTATION REGIME: SOVEREIGNTY, SPACE, AND THE FREEDOM OF
MOVEMENT 301 (Nicholas DeGenova & Nathalie Peutz eds., 2010)). See also Leticia M. Saucedo,
Immigration Law Enforcement Versus Employment Law Enforcement: The Case for Integrated
Protections in the Workplace, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 303, 310 (2010) (describing how fear of
detection makes unauthorized workers afraid to report discrimination in the workplace); Jayesh M.
Rathod, Beyond the “Chilling Effect”: Immigrant Worker Behavior and the Regulation of
Occupational Safety & Health, 14 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 267, 271–74 (2010).
144
Griffith & Gleeson, supra note 42, at 124.
145
See, e.g., EEOC v. DiMare Ruskin, Inc., 2:11-CV-158, 2012 WL 12067868 at *2 (M.D. Fla.
Feb. 15, 2012).
146
Id.
147
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at *4–5, EEOC v. DiMare Ruskin, Inc., 2:11-CV-158,
2012 WL 12067868.
148
DiMare Ruskin, 2012 WL 12067868, at *3.
149
Id. at *5.
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are protected from unlawful employment discrimination under Title VII.”150
But the court premised its grant on the workers’ foregoing their right to
backpay, reinstatement, or front pay, concluding “since [the workers] are not
seeking backpay, front pay, or reinstatement, the [workers’] immigration
status is irrelevant as to damages calculations.”151 Thus, plaintiffs often do
not seek the full array of available remedies when they do bring claims. They
forego seeking backpay, front pay, and reinstatement;152 all of which are
remedies to which successful Title VII plaintiffs are entitled.153
In contrast, unauthorized workers who pursue claims under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA),154 are not subject to the same limitations.155 For
example, in Lamonica v. Safe Hurricane Shutters, the Eleventh Circuit
upheld the district court’s judgment as a matter of law in which the lower
court had awarded actual and liquidated damages to unauthorized workers
who had proved their employer violated the FLSA.156 The employer had
argued that the doctrine of in pari delicto, “which states that ‘a plaintiff who
has participated in wrongdoing may not recover damages resulting from the
wrongdoing’” barred one of the workers from recovering liquidated damages
because he had used a false social security number when he applied for the
job.157 The in pari delicto doctrine is similar to the after-acquired evidence
and mixed motive defenses in that it focuses on employee wrongdoing to
limit employer liability, and the employer bears the burden of proof.158 To

150

Id. (citing Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 95 (1973)).
Id.
152
See EEOC v. SOL Mexican Grill LLC, No. 18-2227, 2019 WL 2896933, at *4 (D.D.C. June
11, 2019) (noting that the EEOC explained it was “not ‘seeking back pay, front pay, or
reinstatement’”); see also Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1069 (9th Cir. 2004) (“No backpay
award has been authorized in this litigation. Indeed, the plaintiffs have proposed several options for
ensuring that . . . no award of backpay is given to any undocumented [noncitizen] in this
proceeding.”).
153
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
154
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), Pub. L. 75–718, (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 203).
155
See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Pie of Port Jefferson Corp., 48 F. Supp. 3d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(barring discovery into immigration status because FLSA permitted and IRCA did not prohibit
unauthorized workers from seeking backpay as a remedy under FLSA).
156
Lamonica v. Safe Hurricane Shutters, 711 F.3d 1299, 1299 (11th Cir. 2014).
157
Id. at 1306.
158
See id. at 1308 (stating that the in pari delicto analysis requires a focus on the wrongdoing
of the employee).
151
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succeed under the doctrine, an employer must demonstrate two things: (1) the
employee “bears at least substantially equal responsibility for the violations
he seeks to redress, and (2) preclusion of the suit would not substantially
interfere with the statute’s policy goals.”159 Rejecting the employer’s
argument, the court reasoned that the worker’s use of a false social security
number did not show that the worker bore responsibility for the FLSA
violation because the misrepresentation had nothing to do with the
employer’s failure to comply with the FLSA.160
Moreover, just as courts in Title VII litigation use the proxy and the
accountability/deterrence justifications, so too do courts in FLSA litigation.
For example, in Zeng Lui v. Donna Karan International, Inc., the court cited
the chilling effect that allowing discovery, even if relevant, into the workers’
immigration status would have on plaintiffs in the future.161 And in Lucas v.
Jerusalem Café, LLC, the court reasoned that unauthorized employees could
seek remedy under the FLSA because it was necessary to hold employers
accountable under both IRCA and the FLSA.162 Accordingly, courts in FLSA
cases rely on the same justification as courts in Title VII cases, but
unauthorized workers in FLSA cases do not experience the same limited
access to remedies.
Why do the justifications lead to full access to remedies under the FLSA,
but limited access under Title VII? The different treatment could be attributed
to the difference in backpay under the FLSA as compared to backpay under
Title VII. Under the FLSA, the court awards backpay for work already
performed,163 while under Title VII, the court awards backpay as make-whole
159

Id.
Id. at 1308–09; see also Vallejo v. Azteca Elec. Constr., Inc., No. CV-13-01207-PHX-NVW,
2015 WL 419634 at *5 (D. Ariz. 2015) (rejecting employer defense of in pari delicto based on
worker’s unauthorized immigration status). Cf. Zeng Liu v. Donna Karan Int’l, Inc., 207 F. Supp.
2d 191, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (granting protective order that barred discovery into noncitizen’s
immigration status because immigration status is irrelevant to FLSA claims); Rengifo v. Erevos
Enters., Inc., No. 06 Civ. 4266(SHS)(RLE), 2007 WL 894376, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2007)
(same).
161
207 F. Supp. 2d at 193 (“[T]here would still remain ‘the danger of intimidation, the danger
of destroying the cause of action’ and would inhibit plaintiffs in pursuing their rights.”).
162
Lucas v. Jerusalem Café, LLC, 721 F.3d 927, 936–37 (8th Cir. 2013); see also Colon v.
Major Perry St. Corp., 987 F. Supp. 2d 451, 462–63 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding unauthorized workers
may seek remedy under the FLSA because to do otherwise would provide incentives for employers
to violate FLSA and IRCA).
163
Lamonica, 711 F.3d at 1308.
160
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relief for work that the worker would have performed but for the employer’s
discriminatory action.164 Also, under the FLSA, a court must award backpay
when a worker proves a violation, while under Title VII, the court may award
backpay in its discretion.165 But as the Court emphasized in Albemarle Paper
Co., Inc. v. Moody, courts should rarely deny backpay in a Title VII case and
the presumption is that courts will award backpay as part of the statutory
scheme to make workers whole.166 In effect, then, courts should approach the
award of backpay under Title VII and the FLSA similarly.
Moreover, just like Title VII, the FLSA provides for both legal and
equitable remedy:
Any employer who violates the provisions of section
215(a)(3) of this title shall be liable for such legal or
equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the
purposes of section 215(a)(3) of this title, including without
limitation employment, reinstatement, promotion, and the
payment of wages lost and an additional equal amount as
liquidated damages.167
Thus, to the extent that the availability of equitable relief opens the door
to discovery into immigration status or allows complicity framing, it would
be expected that courts would find immigration status relevant but too
prejudicial or bar relief to equitable relief based on the workers’ unauthorized
status. But, as described above, that is not what courts are doing. What
explains the different treatment? One explanation may lie in the normative
underpinnings of antidiscrimination law, in particular, anticlassification
principles.

164

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (“[T]he court may . . . order such affirmative action as may
be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with
or without back pay . . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. Back pay
liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the
Commission.”).
165
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416–18 (1975).
166
Id. at 421 (“It follows that, given a finding of unlawful discrimination, backpay should be
denied only for reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central statutory
purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for
injuries suffered through past discrimination.”).
167
29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
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III. THE ANTICLASSIFICATION AND ANTISUBORDINATION
FRAMEWORKS
The antisubordination and anticlassification theories evolved as ways to
explain the normative values that underlie equal protection and
antidiscrimination law generally.168 Scholars who focus on workplace
discrimination law have borrowed from anticlassification and
antisubordination scholarship to describe the normative goals of Title VII and
other federal antidiscrimination in employment laws.169 In effect,
168

Jack M. Balkin and Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification
or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10 (2003) (“Both antisubordination and
anticlassification might be understood as possible ways of fleshing out the meaning of the
antidiscrimination principle, and thus as candidates for the ‘true’ principle underlying
antidiscrimination law”); see also Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 UNIV. OF
CHI. L. REV. 235 (1971) (describing first the antisubordination and anticlassification frameworks in
the context of employment laws); Samuel R. Bagnestos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2006).
169
See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 168, at 265; Bagnestos, supra note 168, at 41; Catherine Fisk, The
Anti-Subordination Principle of Labor and Employment Law Preemption, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 17, 44 (2011); Bradley A. Areheart, The Anticlassification Turn in Employment
Discrimination Law, 63 ALA. L. REV. 955, 955 (2012); see also Stephanie Bornstein,
Antidiscriminatory Algorithms, 70 ALA. L. REV. 519, 544 (2018) (stating “the debate over how to
balance anticlassification and antisubordination principles has dominated much of the discussion of
antidiscrimination law” and arguing that a third principle, antistereotyping, is emanant in
antidiscrimination law).
This article separates the antisubordination and anticlassification frameworks for ease of
analysis. However, antidiscrimination scholars have noted that the two theories often work in
tandem to support antidiscrimination norms. See, e.g., Areheart, supra, at 963 (noting that the two
theories often overlap and are not neatly categorical). As Jack Balkin and Reva Siegel explain, at
the time that Owen Fiss articulated the antisubordination theory, antidiscrimination scholars
“understood the anticlassification and antisubordination principles to have divergent practical
implications for the key issues of the moment: The anticlassification principle impugned affirmative
action, while legitimating facially neutral practices with a racially disparate impact, while the
antisubordination principle impugned facially neutral practices with a racially disparate impact,
while legitimating affirmative action.” Balkin & Siegel, supra note 168, at 12.
Nonetheless, scholars subsequently have noted that they overlap and that they do not always
serve cross-purposes. Mary Anne Case offers two examples of how the anticlassification and
antisubordination worked together to support arguments that prohibiting same-sex marriage was a
form of sex discrimination and that pregnancy discrimination is a form of sex discrimination. Mary
Anne Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns”: Constitutional Sex Discrimination as a
Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1473–74 (2000). Some scholars argued that
prohibiting same sex marriage was sex discrimination because “restricting entry into marriage to
two persons of different sexes had the intent and effect of subordinating women.” Id. at 1473. As
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anticlassification views the normative goal of federal antidiscrimination laws
as achieving a status-neutral workplace, that is, one in which employers do
not take an individual’s membership in a particular group into account when
making decisions.170 Antisubordination theory, on the other hand, theorizes
that to achieve antidiscrimination law’s equality goals, policy makers must
take status into account.171 Because historic structural inequity has created a
lack of opportunities and employers act on unconscious biases,
decisionmakers must consider how membership in a subordinated group has
impacted opportunity to effectively remedy discrimination.172

A. Anticlassification Theory
Under the anticlassification framework, society will have achieved
equality when individuals are no longer categorized based on their racial,
gender, ethnic, or other identity.173 It prohibits decisionmakers from giving
any group preferential treatment. Under an anticlassification framework,
preferential treatment such as affirmative action programs would exacerbate
the goal of antidiscrimination laws.174 How society historically has treated
the group is irrelevant.175 Anticlassification theory’s normative goal is a
color- and sex- blind society.176
Anticlassification theory’s focus is on individual rights—both with
respect to the employer discriminating and the employee who has suffered
Case points out, the argument not only relies on the subordinating effect on women, but also on the
idea that the constraint of the full expression of “human emotions, behavior and relationships”
injures everyone—not just women. Id. at 1473 n.130 (citing Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the
Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 187, 188, 232 (1988)). Regarding pregnancy
discrimination, scholars argued for “an androgynous prototype” with sex-neutral rules, but the
purpose of those rules was to “get the court out of the business of reinforcing traditional sex-based
family roles and to alter the workplace so as to keep it in step with the increased participation of
women.” Id. at 1474 (quoting Wendy W. Williams, Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal
Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325, 352 (1985)).
170
See discussion infra Part III.A.
171
See discussion infra Part III.B.
172
See discussion infra Part III.B.
173
Areheart, supra note 169, at 963–64; see also Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All:
Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1005 (1986) (describing the framework
as “anti-differentiation”).
174
Areheart, supra note 169, at 963.
175
See id.
176
See generally, id. at 963–64; Colker, supra note 173, at 1006.
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the discrimination.177 First, it focuses on the employer’s motivation and does
not consider the structural issues in society that have created the opportunity
for discrimination178 Second, it looks at how the discrimination affected the
individual who was discriminated against and not at the group effects of the
discrimination.179 Accordingly, discrimination is unlawful under the
anticlassification theory when it arises from “invidious motivation” and
similarly situated individuals are treated dissimilarly.180
Title VII can be read as an anticlassificationist law. Most obviously, Title
VII makes it unlawful for employers to discriminate against workers because
of the workers’ sex, race, color, religion, or national origin.181 It even
explicitly prohibits employers from “classif[ying] [their] employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect [the employee’s] status as an employee, because of” a protected
characteristic.182 This language is anticlassificationist on its face.183 And the
Supreme Court acknowledged Title VII’s anticlassification principles in
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. when it determined that Title
VII “prohibits racial discrimination in private employment against white
persons upon the same standards as racial discrimination against
nonwhites.”184
There are at least four explanations for why courts and policy makers
have grounded antidiscrimination policy in anticlassification theory. First,
177

Colker, supra note 173, at 1005–06.
Id. at 1005; see also Llezlie Green Coleman, Disrupting the Discrimination Narrative: An
Argument for Wage and Hour Laws’ Inclusion in Antisubordination Advocacy, 14 STANFORD J.
CIV. R. & CIV. LIB. 49, 71 (2018) (noting that proving discrimination under Title VII is more
complicated than proving wage theft under FLSA because Title VII’s formal equality structure
requires plaintiffs to prove discriminatory motive on the part of the employer).
179
Colker, supra note 173, at 1005.
180
Id. at 1005–06.
181
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2018).
182
Id.
183
Areheart, supra note 169, at 969. Although, as described below, Title VII’s language can
also be read as focusing on antisubordination goals, it is unlawful to deprive employees of
employment “opportunities” on the basis of one of the protected categories. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
As described below, infra Part III.B, antisubordination theory has as one of its goals, not just equal
treatment, but equal opportunity.
184
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280, 286 (1976), cited by Areheart,
supra note 169, at 969–70.
178
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anticlassification theory appeals to policy makers and courts because it seems
to represent a “basic notion of fairness” that is easy to administer.185 Treating
everyone the same, regardless of their individual traits or characteristics, is
easier than effecting substantive equity for subordinated groups.186 The
Court’s reasoning in Young v. United Parcel Service187 is an example of the
Court effectuating formal equality over substantive equality.188 In Young, the
employer did not allow a pregnant employee, whose doctor imposed lifting
restrictions, to work due to the restrictions.189 The employee alleged that the
employer had accommodated other employees who had non-pregnancyrelated lifting restrictions but failed to accommodate her lifting
restrictions.190 The Court held that pregnant employees could state a prima
facie case of sex discrimination under Title VII if they show an “employer
accommodates a large percentage of nonpregnant workers while failing to
accommodate a large percentage of pregnant workers.”191 So, while Title VII
mandates that employers must treat employees equally, employers do not
have to create targeted programs that benefit workers who have
vulnerabilities that make the workplace more challenging for them than their
co-workers.192 As long as the employer treats all employees the same, the
employer has not unlawfully discriminated.
Second, the anticlassification principle can appear to be value neutral.193
It treats the harm of discrimination as the same for everyone.194 Since the
harm is the same, courts can treat individuals the same, including in their

185

Areheart, supra note 169, at 996.
Id. (citing David S. Schwartz, When is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem in Sexual
Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1777–78 (2002)).
187
Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
188
This example comes from Trina Jones. Trina Jones, Title VII At 50: Contemporary
Challenges for U.S. Employment Discrimination Law, 6 ALA. CIV. RIGHTS & CIV. LIBERTIES L.
REV. 45, 71 (2014).
189
135 S. Ct. at 1344.
190
Id.
191
Id. at 1354.
192
Jones, supra note 188, at 71. Of course, the ADA does require employers to make reasonable
accommodations for workers who have a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112.
193
Areheart, supra note 169, at 997.
194
Id. at 998–99.
186

9 MORRISON (DO NOT DELETE)

150

3/23/20 9:18 PM

BAYLOR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:1

access to remedy and distribution of remedy.195 Third, if the law benefits
everyone equally, then it is more likely to gain widespread support among
the public.196 When individuals can see that they stand to benefit directly
from the law, they are more likely to support it.197 The public also is more
likely to support a law that equally benefits everyone because it avoids a
perception that some people benefit from the law at the expense of others. 198
An example of this is the backlash against the ADA and the ADA
Amendments Act (ADAAA).199 Since the ADA and ADAAA protections
apply only to individuals with a qualifying disability, their scope is limited.200
This can result in a perception that the ADA and ADAAA are programs that
provide special benefits to a minority group at the expense of those not in the
group.201
Finally, anticlassification theory does not require policy makers and
courts to grapple with the structural causes of discrimination. It does not
assign fault, other than to the individual decisionmaker who acted
discriminatorily.202 Because the discrimination is the sole fault of the
individual decisionmaker, policy makers and courts do not have to
acknowledge the continued, systemic subordination of particular groups.203
195
Id. (quoting Matthew Scutari, Note, “The Great Equalizer”: Making Sense of the Supreme
Court’s Equal Protection Jurisprudence in American Public Education and Beyond, 97 GEO. L.J.
917, 928–29 (2009)).
196
Id. at 997–98.
197
Id.
198
Areheart, supra note 169, at 998.
199
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101–12113); Michelle A. Travis, Disqualifying Universality Under the Americans With
Disabilities Act Amendment Act, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1689 (2015).
200
Areheart, supra note 169, at 998 (citing Michelle A. Travis, Lasing Back at the ADA
Backlash: How the Americans With Disabilities Act Benefits Americans Without Disabilities, 76
TENN. L. REV. 311, 312 (2009)).
201
Travis, supra note 199, at 1756–58. Travis does not use the term “anticlassification” but
instead uses the term universal; she argues that the ADA and ADAAA are statutes that provide
universal protection, but because of employers’ efforts and lobbying, courts have narrowed the
definition of a “qualified individual” to sort out and narrow the application of the ADA and ADAAA
to people who should otherwise qualify for the statutes’ protections. Id. at 1750–59.
202
Areheart, supra note 169, at 999 (quoting Jack M. Balkin, Plessy, Brown, and Grutter: A
Play in Three Acts, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1689, 1711 (2005)).
203
Id.; see also Jones, supra note 188, at 73 (“It is simply more pleasant and easier all around
to think that we are, or have obtained, our better selves, than to continue the hard and challenging
work of grappling with our continuing imperfections.”).
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As Llezlie Green Coleman notes, advocates and scholars have adopted this
approach because it is “more palatable within the eagerly-embraced ‘postracial’ narrative.”204

B. Antisubordination Theory
Antisubordination theory presumes that not everyone is similarly
situated.205 Therefore, it is not enough for decisionmakers to treat everyone
equally; they may need to treat subordinated groups more favorably than
privileged groups because subordinated groups have experienced a lack of
opportunities.206 Accordingly, the approach supports that the legal regime
should directly redress the disparities experienced by subordinated groups.207
Further, employer policies and decisions that reinforce hierarchy based on a
subordinating characteristic, such as race or sex, are unlawful regardless of
whether the policies and decisions are facially neutral.208
In contrast to anticlassification theory, antisubordination theory is “a
group-based perspective, in two ways.”209 The first way antisubordination
theory is group-based is that “it focuses on society’s role in creating
subordination.”210 The second way in which antisubordination theory is
group-based is that it examines how the subordination “affects, or has
affected, groups of people.”211 Because antisubordination theory is group204

Coleman, supra note 178, at 77 (quoting Samuel R. Bagnestos, Universalism and Civil
Rights (with Notes on Voting Rights After Shelby), 123 YALE L.J. 2838, 2842 (2014)).
205
Areheart, supra note 169, at 963–64. “As elaborated by Fiss and subsequent proponents,
including Catharine MacKinnon, Charles Lawrence, Derrick Bell, Laurence Tribe, and Kenneth
Karst, [antisubordination] is variously called the antisubordination principle, the antisubjugation
principle, the equal citizenship principle, or the anticaste principle.” Balkin & Siegel, supra note
168, at 9 (citing DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE (1987); KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1989); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON
LIFE AND LAW 32–45 (1987); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN 117 (1979); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 16–21, at 1043–
52 (1978); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, The Ego, And Equal Protection: Reckoning With
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 319 (1987)).
206
Areheart, supra note 169, at 964.
207
Colker, supra note 173, at 1007–08.
208
Id.
209
Id. at 1008.
210
Id. at 1008–09.
211
Id. at 1009.
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based, it shifts the focus from the impact on individual workers to the impact
on the group as a whole.212 As a result, it looks to group identity and traits to
determine whether that identity or trait is the basis of the subordination.213
While Title VII is primarily associated with anticlassification principles,
it does include some antisubordination principles.214 At least four
antisubordination provisions and policies are associated with Title VII:
(1) “the history of discrimination faced by African Americans motivated
Congress to pass the statute[;]” (2) affirmative action to allow “a forbidden
trait” to “sometimes be taken into account” to remedy past subordination;
(3) the disparate impact provisions; and (4) classifying employees to
reasonably accommodate them to prevent subordinating behavior.215 The
disparate impact provisions, in particular, present a model of proof that relies
on antisubordination principles because it requires employers to address
policies that have a discriminatory effect even if they are facially neutral.216
The Americans with Disabilities Act217 primarily derives from
antisubordination principles: Congress noted the history of discrimination
against people with disabilities, the structural barriers people with disabilities
encounter that lead to discrimination, and it requires not just equal
opportunity but reasonable accommodation.218 Similarly, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)219 is based on antisubordination
principles because it applies only to individuals over the age of forty whose
employer has discriminated against them because of their age.220 And
Congress enacted the ADEA because of a history of employers
discriminating against older employees.221
212

See id. at 1007–08.
Id. at 1007–08; Areheart, supra note 169, at 963–64.
214
Areheart, supra note 169, at 970.
215
See id. at 970–72; see also Bornstein, supra note 169, at 542 (“Title VII recognizes both the
anticlassification principle, in its prohibition of disparate treatment, and the antisubordination
principle, in its prohibition of unjustified disparate impact.”).
216
Saucedo, The Employer Preference for the Subservient Worker, supra note 3, at 1019.
217
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–336, 104 Stat. 327, amended by
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–325, 122 Stat. 3533 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 12102–12103 (2009)).
218
Areheart, supra note 169, at 973–75.
219
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90–202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012)).
220
Areheart, supra note 169, at 972.
221
Id. at 972–73.
213
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Many scholars have argued that antisubordination principles would better
address discrimination. 222 Because antisubordination requires courts and
policy makers to address the structural causes of discrimination, it better
prevents and addresses unconscious or more subtle forms of bias.223 It also
allows courts to address actions that appear to be neutral but result in a
discriminatory impact on subordinated groups because antisubordination’s
goal is to address the causes of subordination.224 Importantly, it requires the
decisionmaker to explicitly consider the subordination and society’s role in
creating the subordination.225 In the context of racial discrimination, this
requires that policy makers “adequately grapple with the systemic vestiges
of slavery, Jim Crow, and racial animosity that contribute to the continued
subordination of members of racial and ethnic minorities.”226 And it avoids
essentializing members of subordinated groups. It instead requires that policy
makers and decisionmakers consider the ways in which intersectionality,
such as race and class, exacerbates the subordination.227

222
See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 178, at 85 (“Anti-subordination is a critical tenet of the critical
race theory movement and has found support among constitutional law scholars and others
committed to the law and legal institutions’ ability to not just prevent discrimination but to elevate
the social, economic, and political positions of subordinated groups.”); Balkin & Siegel, supra note
168, at 9 n.2 (citing scholars who write in the antisubordination tradition).
223
Bagnestos, supra note 168, at 5–10.
224
Areheart, supra note 169, at 971 (discussing Title VII’s disparate impact doctrine);
Bagnestos, supra note 168, at 5–10 (discussing Title VII’s disparate impact doctrine); see also
Saucedo, The Employer Preference for the Subservient Worker, supra note 3, at 1019 (same).
225
Areheart, supra note 169, at 1005–06 (discussing the implications of the anticlassification
turn in employment discrimination and its effect on the consideration of race). Areheart writes:

even if we reach a place where racism no longer impairs the opportunities available to
minorities, social and economic deprivations will continue to do so by reinforcing
stereotypes and thus possibly inflaming racist predispositions. We might desire to pay
attention to such conditions/deprivations for reasons that are non-instrumental (for
example, that they tend to cause misery).
Id.
226
227

Coleman, supra note 178, at 68.
See id.
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IV. THE ANTISUBORDINATION AND ANTICLASSIFICATION
FRAMEWORKS EXACERBATE THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE PROXY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY/DETERRENCE JUSTIFICATIONS
The limits of the justifications for protecting unauthorized workers can
be traced to or at least related to the justifications’ reliance on
anticlassification and antisubordination principles. First, the proxy
justification relies directly on anticlassification theory. In a sense, it is blind
to status. It requires the court and policy makers to provide the same
protection to unauthorized workers as to authorized workers, regardless of
that workers’ immigration status. It also is focused on how the unlawful
discrimination affects the individual worker. Courts are concerned with
whether the employer discriminated against the individual worker—defined
by whether the employer treated the unauthorized worker differently from a
similarly situated individual based on the worker’s race, gender, national
origin, color, or religion.228
The McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting analysis is an example of how
the Court has operationalized anticlassificationist principles.229 To
demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination where there is no direct
evidence of discrimination, the employee must show that (1) the employee
was qualified for the position; (2) that the employee belonged to a protected
category; (3) the employer failed to promote or hire the employee, or
disciplined or fired the employee; and (4) the employer treated someone not
in the protected category more favorably or left the position open.230 If the
employee demonstrates the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
employer to proffer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action.231
At that point, the employee must show that the employer’s proffered reason
was pretextual.232 The McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting analysis is
anticlassificationist on its face as it explicitly names the wrong as treating an

228

See, e.g., EEOC v. Phase 2 Invs., Inc., 310 Fed. Supp. 3d 550, 576 (D. Md. 2018) (“[Title
VII] authorized suits against employers for discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin,
religion or sex. It did not restrict the class of persons who could bring such suits by citizenship or
immigration status.”).
229
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
230
Id. at 802.
231
Id. at 802–03.
232
Id. at 804.
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employee differently based on the employee’s status and views the goal of
Title VII as achieving a race-neutral workplace.233
This works against unauthorized workers because a worker must be
similarly situated to other workers—and unauthorized workers are differently
situated from authorized workers with respect to their immigration status. For
example, in Egbuna v. Time-Life Libs., Inc., the Fourth Circuit emphasized
the unauthorized status of an employee when it decided the employee could
not assert a prima facie case of employment discrimination.234 The employee
had previously worked for the company and resigned from his job because
he planned to return to his home country.235 During his employment, his visa
had expired, but the company did not note its expiration.236 After the
employee decided not to return to his home country, he asked the company
to reinstate him into his job.237 The employee alleged that the company had
agreed to hire him but then rescinded the offer because the company
discovered he had cooperated with the EEOC in a sexual harassment
investigation.238
In Egbuna, the Fourth Circuit used the anticlassification principles
announced in McDonnell-Douglas to determine that the employee’s lack of
work authorization meant that he was unqualified for the position and ended
its inquiry at step one of the prima facie case.239 As the dissent pointed out,
the employer did not find out that the employee was unauthorized until after
it had made its decision.240 So the majority misapplied the after-acquired
evidence doctrine.241 The result is that even when an employer has
intentionally discriminated against an employee, it can avoid any liability
based on the employee’s unauthorized status. This can be traced to

233

Id. at 801 (“[Title VII’s goals involve] societal as well as personal interests on both sides of
this equation. The broad, overriding interest, shared by employer, employee, and consumer, is
efficient and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair and racially neutral employment and
personnel decisions”) (emphasis added).
234
Egbuna v. Time-Life Libs., Inc., 153 F.3d 184, 187 (4th Cir. 1998).
235
Id. at 185.
236
Id.
237
Id.
238
Id. at 186.
239
Id. at 188.
240
Id. at 189 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
241
Id.
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antidiscrimination law’s reliance on the anticlassification principle of treating
similarly situated individuals equally.
The proxy justification’s reliance on anticlassification theory’s statusneutral and individually-focused principles leads to other justification’s
failures. Although courts are blind to the workers’ status in determining
whether workers can sue employers who violate Title VII, that blindness can
mean that policy makers do not have to consider whether unauthorized
workers “in society are subordinated, or, if so, how bad the subordination has
been.”242 This can leave unanswered the role that the workers’ status played
in making the worker more vulnerable. It also increases the likelihood that
the focus will remain on individual workers and how they should reform to
comply with immigration laws, rather than a change to the policies and
structures that have led to the vulnerability.243
For example, in EEOC v. Switching Systems Division of Rockwell
International, Corp., the employer terminated a group of employees who had
falsely stated on their employment application that they were United States
citizens or provided incorrect social security numbers.244 The company’s
policies set out offenses that could subject an employee to discipline or
termination, which included falsifying employment applications or
questionnaires.245 At the time that the company fired the workers, some had
subsequently obtained immigration status.246 Two other employees who had
provided false information were only disciplined—one was a United States
citizen and the other’s nationality was unknown.247 The EEOC alleged that
the company fired the immigrant employees because of their national
origin.248 In rejecting the EEOC’s claim, the court relied on the employees’
unauthorized status at the time of their application to shift blame for the
decision from the employee to the employer, “because of [the employee’s]

242

Areheart, supra note 169, at 999 (quoting Jack M. Balkin, Plessy Brown, and Grutter: A
Play in Three Acts, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1689, 1711 (2005)).
243
Cf. Sharpless, supra note 117, at 707–08 (describing the limitations of respectability politics
and its role in “reinforc[ing] and reproduc[ing] existing social and economic inequalities in our
society”).
244
EEOC v. Switching Sys. Div. of Rockwell Int’l, Corp., 783 F. Supp. 369, 370 (N.D. Ill.
1992).
245
Id.
246
Id. at 370–71.
247
Id. at 371.
248
Id. at 369–70.
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lack of citizenship status, [she] was compelled to falsify information in order
to secure employment. If [she] had been a United States citizen when she
made application, then presumably she would not have falsified her
application, and she would still have a job with defendant.”249
Further, anticlassification’s status-neutral and individually focused
principles leave unexamined the structural causes of the discrimination the
worker suffered: “the mainstream perception becomes that the exploitation
of immigrant workers is entirely the result of private actions.”250 It also can
exacerbate the discrimination the worker may experience as a result of the
workers’ statutorily protected class, especially race, gender, and national
origin.
And, as described above, the failure to account for those intersections can
limit access to remedies.251 Because unauthorized workers forego remedies
to avoid discovery into their immigration status, it also means that courts
often leave unexamined the role the employer played in creating the
vulnerability.252 That can impact what workers can recover in punitive
damages.253
Second, the employer accountability justification implicates
anticlassification’s focus on “invidious motivations.” Inclusion of
unauthorized workers in the coverage of federal antidiscrimination laws is
justified only when the employer intentionally discriminates on the basis of
a protected characteristic. This limits the full application of federal
antidiscrimination laws with respect to unauthorized workers. It calls into
question, not just employers’ motivations, but also whether unauthorized
workers are at fault. Kathleen Kim has shown how this framing results in a
belief that the worker is complicit in the unauthorized work: “the worker’s
affirmative wrongdoing evidence[s] his collusion in the unlawful
employment arrangement, thereby precluding him from obtaining relief.”254
Because the theory looks at the motivations of employers, it invites courts to
also look at the motivations of workers.
249

Id. at 375.
Lee, supra note 8, at 1100.
251
See discussion supra Part II.C.
252
Saucedo, The Employer Preference for the Subservient Worker, supra note 3, at 968–70
(arguing that employers rely on the under-enforcement of workplace laws and over-enforcement of
immigration laws to cultivate an exploitable workforce made up of primarily unauthorized workers).
253
Punitive damages are available to a Title VII plaintiff. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1).
254
Kim, supra note 3, at 1580.
250
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An example of this appears in Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Mississippi,
LLC.255 The Fifth Circuit determined that a group of presumptively
unauthorized workers’ pending U-visa applications were probative of the
workers’ motives behind reporting workplace harassment to the EEOC.256
Noncitizens who are the victim of a crime, provide assistance or who are
willing to provide assistance to a law enforcement agency investigating or
prosecuting the crime, and who have suffered substantial physical or mental
abuse as a result of the crime can apply for a U-visa.257 The workers in the
poultry plant alleged action that would not only be sexual and racial
harassment under Title VII but also would violate criminal laws:
Supervisors allegedly groped female workers, and in some cases
assaulted them more violently; offered female workers money or promotions
for sex; made sexist and racist comments; punched, elbowed, and otherwise
physically abused workers of both sexes; and demanded money from them in
exchange for permission for bathroom breaks, sick leave, and transfers to
other positions. . . . When workers complained or resisted, [company]
managers allegedly ignored them, and some debone supervisors allegedly
retaliated by docking their pay; demoting, reassigning, or firing them; and
threatening to physically harm them or have them arrested or deported.258
While the court acknowledged that “substantial evidence suggests that
serious abuse is all too common in many industries reliant on immigrant
workers, including the modern-day poultry industry[,]” it did not form a
significant part of the court’s reasoning, nor did the court state how the
workers’ unauthorized status could have led to the discrimination.259 Instead,
the court elided the status, mentioning only “immigrant” workers, which is
closely associated with protected characteristics under Title VII, national
origin, and race/ethnicity.260 And when it mentioned the workers’
unauthorized status, it focused on their compliance with immigration laws,
writing: “we find it plausible that some undocumented immigrants might be
255

Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Miss., LLC., 838 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 558–59. The Court ultimately reversed the order that required the EEOC to turn over
discovery related to the U-visas because it would harm the public interest (not the individual
worker’s interests), but still found that the individual workers would have to turn over anonymized
U- visa applications. Id. at 563–64.
257
Immigration and Nationality Act, § 101(a)(15)(U), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U) (2012).
258
Cazorla, 838 F.3d at 544–45.
259
Id. at 558.
260
Id.
256
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tempted to stretch the truth in order to obtain lawful status” despite noting
the multiple checks on fraud in the U-visa process.261
Unfortunately, antisubordination theory does not provide a complete
foundation for including unauthorized workers in antidiscrimination law’s
protections. First, antisubordination theory, out of necessity, emphasizes the
subordinated status of groups of workers. And that can require advocates to
portray subordinated workers as powerless in ways that conflict with
workers’ own perceptions of themselves and lived experiences.262 This is not
to say that workers do, in fact, lack autonomy and agency. Indeed, researchers
have documented the ways in which noncitizens’ individual precarity has
spurred collective action that propels greater agency.263 Other scholars have
described the ways in which claim-making can empower workers because it
erases one of the contributors to subordination, silence.264 Instead, the
narrative that advocates sometimes must adopt to position their clients as
victims of unscrupulous employers to get buy-in from the decisionmaker can
exacerbate the effect that the accountability and deterrence justification has

261

Id. at 558–59.
See, e.g., Sarah Morando Lakhani, Producing Immigrant Victims’ “Right” to Legal Status
and the Management of Uncertainty, 38 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 442, 453–60 (2013) (describing
the challenge for advocates in creating “clean victim” narratives in which the client is the subject of
“nonmutual control” by their abusers so that unauthorized immigrant clients can receive U-visas
based on their status as victims of crime).
Mary Anne Case has also argued that antisubordination’s focus on groups rather than individual
effects could lead some courts and policy makers to revert to “a separate but equal” approach to
resolving discrimination. She asserts that one of the main proponents of the antisubordination strand
in the constitutional law of sex discrimination was Justice Rehnquist. Case, supra note 169, at 1475.
He objected to striking down laws just because they classify women differently from men but noted
that the law must subordinate women for it to count as unlawful sex discrimination. Id. As Case
notes, the problem with Rehnquist’s approach is that it leads to a “vision of separate (but equal)
spheres” that ignores the demeaning and subordinating effect of insisting that “individuals of either
sex” must match the stereotype associated with their sex. Id. This is because it “is inconsistent with
the equality of rights which pertains to citizenship, National and State, [and] the personal liberty
enjoyed by everyone within the United States.” Id. at 1476 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537, 555 (Harlan, J. dissenting), overruled by, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
263
Marcel Paret & Shannon Gleeson, Precarity and Agency Through A Migration Lens, 20
CITIZENSHIP STUDIES 277 (2016).
264
Llezlie Green Coleman, Exploited at the Intersection: A Critical Race Feminist Analysis of
Undocumented Latina Workers and the Role of the Private Attorney General, 22 VA. J. OF SOCIAL
POL’Y & THE LAW 397 (2015).
262
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of casting unauthorized workers as subservient workers who are there for
employers to exploit.265
A second major drawback of antisubordination theory is that it requires
policy makers to recognize subordinated groups as worthy of protection. Ira
Katzelson provides an example of this drawback in the context of the New
Deal workplace laws—the Fair Labor Standards Act and National Labor
Relations Act.266 Initially southern legislators supported the laws because
they did not require southern legislators to recognize the subordinated status
of most African American workers, but their support waned once Congress
tried to include African Americans in the New Deal laws’ coverage.267
Katzelson shows that the New Deal workplace laws successfully made it
through Congress because even though there was little union presence in the
South, “[t]he South was willing to support [the Democratic industrial
constituencies’] wishes provided these statutes did not threaten Jim Crow.
So southern members traded their votes for the exclusion of farmworkers and
maids, the most widespread black categories of employment, from the
protections offered by these statutes.”268 Katzelson traces the decline in
Southern legislators’ support for labor laws as evidenced in the LaborManagement Relations Act, in part, to labor unions’ “increasing, unexpected
success in the South” and to non-Southern new deal liberals’ press for “a
more expansive federal administration to advance labor interests without
relenting where race intersected with labor[.]”269 Further, Katzelson explains
that Southern legislators “now had good reason to fear that labor organizing
might fuel civil rights activism.”270
Scholars have noted similar patterns in advocating for immigrant
rights.271 Maria Olivares has described the limits of adopting such rhetoric to
argue for noncitizen rights.272 She attributes the failure of interest
265

See discussion supra Part II.B.; Lakhani, supra note 262, at 453–60.
IRA KATZELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD HISTORY OF
RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 55 (2005).
267
Id.
268
Id.
269
Id. at 67–68.
270
Id. at 68.
271
See, e.g., Mariela Olivares, Narrative Reform Dilemmas, 82 MO. L. REV. 1089, 1136 (2017).
272
Id. at 1136 (quoting Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1349
(1988)).
266
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convergence as the primary cause because the majority perpetually views
noncitizens as outsiders whose interests do not match those of the majority:
“[a]s long as immigrants remain outsiders and their interests do not
adequately converge with the interests of the majority . . . traditional reform
frameworks are futile.”273 The rhetoric about immigrants in general positions
them as outsiders whose interests are different from U.S. citizens.274 When
advocates use the proxy justification to argue that Title VII and other
antidiscrimination laws to protect unauthorized workers, the justification
breaks down because unauthorized workers do differ from their authorized
counterparts.275 And the majority, at least for now, is not interested in
recognizing that difference as one that deserves protection.276 Thus, even
though being unauthorized does make it more likely that workers will face
unlawful discrimination on the basis of a protected characteristic, the
unauthorized part of the workers’ identity makes it less likely that policy
makers and courts will acknowledge the subordination.
Third, courts and policy makers may resist relying on antisubordination
principles because they view it as unfair to make employers responsible for
implementing change when the problem stems from larger societal
structures.277 For example, even though the ADA is based on
antisubordination principles, courts have been reluctant to require employers
to provide accessible transportation despite that it would not cause an undue
burden on employers.278 Courts’ reluctance to hold employers responsible for
problems they view as societal, means that the accountability/deterrence
justification provides a way for courts to engage in complicity framing to
assign fault not to the employer but to the worker.279
Finally, antisubordination historically has relied on immutability as part
of the justification for protection, and that can create challenges for workers
who have a characteristic, such as lack of immigration status, that society
believes is within the workers’ control. In the context of Constitutionally
273

Id.
Id.
275
See discussion supra Part II.C.
276
See discussion of IRCA supra Part I.
277
Bagnestos, supra note 168, at 42–43.
278
Id. at 43.
279
See, e.g., Escobar v. Spartan Sec. Serv., 281 F. Supp. 2d 895, 897 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (holding
that even if the employer acted wrongly by subjecting the employee to sexual harassment and
retaliation, the employee could not claim backpay because he was unauthorized).
274
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protected statuses, Trina Jones outlines four factors on which courts have
relied to determine protected status: “(1) immutability; (2) visibility; (3)
relevancy; and (4) a pervasive history of discrimination.”280 With respect to
immutability in the context of employment discrimination, Owen Fiss
identifies it as one of the principle drivers of “the sense of unfairness
engendered by the [use of race] as the basis of an employment decision.”281
Fiss points out that immutability is related to the “absence of individual
control.”282 It is unfair to judge individuals on something that is outside of
their control because society values the idea that individual control “provides
the prospect for upward mobility.”283 This idea allows society to rationalize
“the unequal distribution of status and wealth among people in the
society.”284 Failure becomes a problem within an individual’s own control.285
Immutability’s service to the idea of individual control also assumes that “the
allocation of scarce employment opportunities represent, to some extent, a
reward.”286 Though scholars have challenged these factors, especially
immutability and visibility, courts and policy makers continue to use them as
an analytical tool.287
In sum, anticlassification and antisubordination theories reinforce the
limits of the justifications immigration advocates and scholars have put
forward as reasons to include unauthorized workers within the protection of
federal antidiscrimination law. They lead to limited remedies and more
vulnerability in the workplace.

V.

CONCLUSION

This article has described the ways in which the main justifications for
protecting unauthorized workers have failed to provide full protection. Those
justifications rest on advocates and scholars’ efforts to distinguish federal
antidiscrimination plaintiffs from the unauthorized worker in Hoffman. It has

280

Jones, supra note 188, at 63 (citing Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135, 146 (2011)).
281
Fiss, supra note 168, at 241. The other attribute Fiss identified was relevancy—i.e., “race is
not considered an accurate predictor of [an individual’s] productivity.” Id.
282
Id.
283
Id.
284
Id.
285
Id.
286
Id.
287
Jones, supra note 188, at 63.
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meant that unauthorized workers are positioned as proxies for United States
workers and workers with authorization. It also has led advocates to
emphasize employers’ lawbreaking and the need to hold them accountable to
deter future violations. These justifications have provided some protection
for unauthorized workers. But they have led to limits on remedies and fed
into harmful stereotypes about unauthorized workers. But it is not only these
justifications that have resulted in this harm.
This article has highlighted how the two main antidiscrimination
frameworks exacerbate the limitations of justifications used to protect
unauthorized workers. Anticlassification theory’s status-neutral and
individually-focused principles intensify the differences between authorized
workers and their authorized colleagues that already limit full remedy under
the proxy justification. Similarly, anticlassification’s status-neutral and
individually-focused principles reinforce harmful stereotypes that lead to
complicity framing. Antisubordination’s emphasis on membership in a
subordinated group, antisubordination’s need for majority buy-in, and
antisubordination’s historical reliance on immutability also contribute to the
accountability/deterrence justification’s amplification of unauthorized
workers’ vulnerability.
While this article has focused on unauthorized workers’ inability to
achieve full remedy under federal antidiscrimination law, anticlassification
and antisubordination’s limitations also likely contribute to other vulnerable
workers’ inability to achieve full remedy under antidiscrimination laws due
to imperfect proxies. For example, formerly incarcerated individuals face
challenges similar to unauthorized workers when it comes to asserting Title
VII race discrimination claims. They are often subject to complicity
framing288 and that could be due to anticlassification’s focus on the individual
claimant. Caregivers, too, have difficulty fitting their claims into the existing
framework for gender discrimination claims under Title VII.289 Thus, this
article’s insights on the failures of anticlassification and antisubordination
principles in the context of the unauthorized workplace could also provide
288

Kimani Paul-Emile, Beyond Title VII: Rethinking Race, Ex-Offender Status, And
Employment Discrimination in The Information Age, 100 VA. L. REV. 893, 920–27 (2014)
(describing the bars to claims-making under Title VII that formerly incarcerated individuals face).
289
Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, Women’s
Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 371 (2001); see also Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, Caregivers in the
Courtroom: The Growing Trend of Family Responsibilities Discrimination, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 171
(2006) (describing increased litigation under Title VII involving caregivers).
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insights for scholars and advocates addressing the challenges other
vulnerable workers face.

